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ABSTRACT 
 
As the ongoing debate on aid effectiveness takes a new trail of assessing the efficiency of aid 
in a disaggregated manner rather than aggregate aid as done in the past, this study seeks to 
compare how aid delivery modalities affect economic growth. The study analyses the relative 
effectiveness of programme and project aid effectiveness in promoting economic growth in 
the Sub Sahara Africa region, one of the world’s poorest region, yet claimed to be the leading 
beneficiary of foreign aid. Programme aid is allegedly more effective in promoting growth 
and poverty reduction than project aid since it entails the building of local capacity as well as, 
strong partnerships between donors and recipient countries. Project aid is blamed for aid 
fragmentation, and misalignment of aid funded activities with national priorities. To prove 
the better modality for aid effectiveness, two growth models are estimated using panel data 
from 41 Sub Sahara African countries for the period 2005 to 2014. In the first model, total aid 
is disaggregated into programme and project aid variables to see how they relate with growth, 
and in the second model the aid variables are interacted with policy to see how policy affects 
their effectiveness on growth. The findings show that indeed programme aid is effective in 
promoting growth in the Sub Sahara region, though it has diminishing marginal returns on 
growth. Project aid is shown to have no effect on growth on its own, but will positively affect 
growth in good policy environments as shown by the positive marginal effect of project aid 
on growth when it is interacted by policy. The study concludes with a discussion on the 
application of programme aid and policy recommendations for aid effectiveness in Sub 
Sahara Africa. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to analyse and compare which aid delivery modality 
between programme and project aid is more effective in promoting economic growth in the 
Sub Sahara African (SSA) region. The better modality would then be strategically applied to 
achieve aid effectiveness in the region. 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
Being host to a large part of the world’s “bottom billion”, the Sub Saharan Africa 
region has attracted significant foreign aid over the years. The region is claimed to be the 
leading beneficiary of foreign aid globally. Since 1960, the region received over US$568 
billion through foreign aid, representing roughly 15% of the African continent GDP (Douznet 
and Urbain, 2013). Despite these huge inflows, the region’s economic development has very 
much been subdued, and as a result, the region hosts most of the world’s poorest countries. 
Most of the SSA countries are faced with high unemployment and poverty levels, high 
mortality rates, low levels of education and limited access to health care facilities (Ogundipe, 
Ojeaga, & Ogundipe, 2014). 
The SSA experience differs from some developing countries such as China,  where an 
increase in aid from 0.2% in 1980 to 3% in 1985 resulted in an increased economic growth 
rate from approximately 6% to 12% during the same period,  signifying that aid was effective 
in accomplishing economic growth (Ogundipe et al., 2014).  
One potential cause of the aid ineffectiveness in the region could be the fact that aid 
was not strategically delivered for economic growth. It was delivered without putting 
consideration on which aid delivery modality between programme and project aid is better 
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[best] for promoting economic growth. The region receives its aid mostly through programme 
and project aid modalities with development oriented countries receiving relatively higher 
program aid than those countries which are not development oriented receiving relatively 
high project aid. 
1.3 Significance of study 
Aid can be applied in two ways to contribute to poverty reduction. One way is to 
allocate the aid directly to the people, and the other one is through economic growth. In his 
survey of empirical studies on aid paradigm for poverty reduction, Weiss (2008) found out 
that economic growth was the major factor behind poverty reduction in developing countries. 
Thus one way of reducing poverty effectively in SSA will be to ensure that the foreign aid 
delivered to this region promotes economic growth. This can be done through adopting pro-
poor growth strategies which are broad and inclusive. As the ongoing debate on aid 
effectiveness takes a new path in assessing the efficiency of aid in a disaggregated manner 
rather than aggregate aid as in the past, it is therefore, critical to compare how aid delivery 
modalities affect economic growth so that the best modality for promoting economic growth 
can be adopted.  
Of late program aid has been promoted as a preferable aid delivery modality over 
other alternatives including project aid because it is believed to: increase local ownership of 
development programs; improve local accountability through use of country systems, make 
aid inflows more predictable; and reduce transaction costs (European Commission, 2013). 
Moreover, assessments of program aid in supporting public sector reforms affirms its ability 
to improve recipient countries’ public finance systems and improving capacity in policy 
making processes (Independent Evaluation Group, 2008). In Mali for example, program aid 
contributed to the achievement of an average economic growth of 5% during the 
implementation period of the Joint Budget Support Programme from 2003 to 2009. This 
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achievement is believed to have been anchored on the sound macroeconomic policies pursued 
as well as a significant increase in budget resources coming through program aid (OECD 
DAC Joint Evaluation, 2011). 
On the other hand, despite being the mostly favoured delivery modality by donors, 
project aid has been touted as ineffective in promoting economic growth in recipient 
countries, as it leads to the proliferation of parallel management systems within or outside the 
public administration, which impedes smooth coordination, planning and budgeting, of aid 
financed operations. Furthermore, project aid is associated with high transaction costs, policy 
inconsistencies as each project will tend to have its own priorities which might not be 
reflective of the national developmental goals, but reflecting the views of the donor and the 
project staff (Jelovac & Vandeninden, 2008).  
The statistical trends on the two modalities for SSA show that the region receives 
more project aid than program aid, and that the project aid trend is increasing at a faster pace 
than that of program aid. The seemingly less uptake of program aid in comparison with 
project aid may imply that donors have not developed confidence in country systems of 
recipient countries.  The prevalent use of the project aid modality at the expense of program 
aid could be one reason why aid has not been effective in promoting growth in the SSA 
region since project aid has been shown to be ineffective in promoting growth (Jelovac & 
Vandeninden, 2008). Figure 1 below shows the program and project aid trends for SSA 
during the period 2005 to 2014. 
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Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System 
Figure 1: Program and project aid trends for the SSA region 
 
Currently, not much empirical work has been done to compare in a formal model the 
relative effectiveness of programme and project aid in stimulating growth (Cordella and 
Dell’Ariccia, 2003). This study therefore, wishes to fill in this gap by comparing empirically, 
the relative effectiveness of program and project aid on economic growth using recent data 
for the Sub Sahara African region.  
1.4 Research questions 
i. Which aid delivery modality between programme and project aid promotes more 
economic growth in SSA; and 
ii. Is the impact of programme or project aid on growth conditional on economic 
policies. 
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1.5 Hypothesis and assumptions 
With the assumption that donors allocate aid resources for purely developmental 
purposes, the hypothesis of this study is that programme aid is more effective in promoting 
economic growth than project aid in the Sub Sahara Africa region.  
Programme aid entails building of strong partnerships between donors and recipient 
countries, involves participatory development and country ownership of aid funded 
programmes. It also gives basis for mutual accountability between donors and recipient 
countries, as well as use of country systems, which are the key principles of aid effectiveness 
(Paris declaration on aid effectiveness (2005). 
Most SSA countries are signatories to the Paris Declaration and are working towards 
building strong partnerships with donors for aid effectiveness. The 2011 OECD report on 
implementation of the Paris declaration during the period 2005 to 2010 showed that notable 
progress had been made by both donors and recipient countries in implementing the Paris 
declaration on aid effectiveness, though most of the targets were unmet. This progress and the 
increased capacity development efforts by donors to increase local capacity for participatory 
development in the Sub Sahara region (Jones, Bailey, & Lyytikäinen, 2007), position the 
region at a better place for programme aid effectiveness.  
Though by design the insulation of project aid from government manipulation is 
desirable since it gives donors more power to control the aid funded activities, and ensuring 
development objectives are met (Gunatilake, 2007), its drawbacks which include, aid 
fragmentation, lack of ownership by local governments, misalignment of aid objectives to 
national priorities, and high transaction costs far outweigh the benefits, thereby thwarting 
project aid’s effectiveness in stimulating economic growth. 
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1.6 Research Method 
The study will run regressions to estimate the impact of programme and project aid on 
economic growth, using panel data from 41 SSA countries for the period 2005 to 2014. The 
dependable variable will be the growth rate of the real GDP per capita as a proxy for 
economic growth. Independent variables will be Programme and Project aid as a ratio of 
GDP, whilst control variables will be; logarithm of initial real GDP per capita, investment, 
trade, education, life expectancy, economic and institutional policy.  
1.7 Data and sample 
Panel data for 41 Sub-Sahara African countries will be collected from the World Bank 
Development Indicators, and the Creditor Reporting System of the OECD. 
1.8 Organisation of the study 
The paper is outlined as follows: Chapter 2 will discuss the theoretical and empirical 
literature on aid effectiveness, putting particular emphasis on how programme or project aid 
affects growth. Chapter 3 will look at the model description, data used, as well as the 
methodology. Chapter 4 discusses the results and interpretation, whilst, the conclusion and 
recommendations will be discussed in chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Literature on the effect of aid on stimulating economic growth has been ambiguous; 
with some studies claiming that aid promotes growth (Hansen & Tarp 2001; Moreira, 2005), 
while others declared that aid has a negative (Easterly, 2003) or no impact on growth (Rajan 
& Subramanian, 2008) or that it can only promote growth under good policy environments 
and good political institutions  (Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Kosack, 2003).  
Though much work has been done on determining the impact of aggregate aid on 
economic growth, most of these studies have neglected a fundamental issue of the functional 
classification of development aid and how different aid delivery modalities may have 
different effects on governments’ behaviour and the macro economy. Ouattara and Strobl 
(2004) claimed that ignoring the effects exerted by the different aid delivery modalities may 
result in aggregation bias in the findings which in turn will mislead policy recommendations. 
Thus the ensuing review of literature will discuss the rationale and assumptions behind 
programme and project aid.  
2.1 Empirical review of the impact of project and programme aid on economic growth 
Cordella and Dell’Ariccia (2003) estimated the impact of project aid and budget 
support on economic growth, using the Burnside Dollar (2000) methodology and dataset, and 
data from the OECD Creditor Reporting System for budget support and project aid during the 
period 1970 to 1993. They also used the GMM estimators to check robustness of their results. 
They consistently found that neither the budget support nor project aid on their own had 
significant impact on economic growth. However, when interacted with policy the two 
modalities become significant, therefore, implying that the relationship between the two 
modalities and growth is more conditional to policy environment. Furthermore they found 
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that budget support is more effective than project aid where macroeconomic policies are 
relatively good and less effective with poor macroeconomic policies.  
On the other hand, Ouattara and Strobl (2004) also following the Burnside and Dollar 
approach and using the Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2003) dataset for the period 1970 to 
1997, which is an extension of the Burnside and Dollar dataset, used the GMM systems 
estimator to compare the effect of programme and project aid on growth. They found that 
project aid had a positive effect on growth, whilst programme aid had a negative effect. 
When they interacted the two modalities with policy, the results showed that good policies 
had no effect on the impact of programme or project aid on growth.  
The difference in findings when the two studies basically used the same methodology 
could have emerged from the fact that the two studies used different forms of data for 
programme aid and project aid. Despite the point that both studies retrieved their data from 
the OECD Creditor Reporting System, Cordella and Dell’Ariccia (2003) used project aid and 
budget support data in commitment form, whilst Ouattara and Strobl (2004) converted the 
data from commitment to net disbursement forms, using a method which assumed that the 
respective share of programme and project aid in commitment form to the total aid in 
commitment form was more or less similar to their respective shares in total aid disbursement 
form. 
The Ouattara and Strobl (2004) approach is preferable although not reliable in that it 
tries to present the two aid variables in a more realistic though not accurate form, because 
usually what is committed is not be what is disbursed. Thus using data in commitment form 
as done by Cordella and Dell’Ariccia can overestimate the true effect of aid on growth since 
commitments are normally higher than disbursements (McGillivary & Quattara, 2003).  
However, besides the afore mentioned studies, not much empirical work has been 
done to test and compare the relative effectiveness of budget support and project aid in 
stimulating economic growth. The limited empirical literature and the mixed findings 
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highlighted above leave much room for more research on the topic. Thus this study seeks to 
add to the empirical literature on the relative effectiveness of budget support and project aid 
in stimulating economic growth, putting focus on one of the leading aid recipient region, the 
Sub Sahara Africa.  
2.2 Empirical review on the effectiveness of Programme aid 
As the prominence of programme aid increases, a number of evaluations have been 
made to assess its effectiveness in some countries where it has been applied. This section 
discusses the assessment results for three Sub Sahara African countries namely; Mali, 
Tanzania, and Zambia. 
  In Mali, programme aid helped in increasing national budget financing and the 
predictability of aid, promoting efficiency in execution of national policies, facilitating the 
attainment of sustainable outcomes and economic growth and development. The main lesson 
from the assessment of the Mali experience was that programme aid was effective when the 
objective of the aid was to support and monitor the implementation of a given policy, rather 
than when the objective was to change policy through conditionality (OECD DAC Joint 
Evaluation, 2011). It was therefore, concluded that programme aid is most effective when 
used to support well-established national policies, with clear implementation structures and 
strong political commitment, and that in circumstances where these elements were absent, it 
was hard to institute them through programme aid (OECD DAC Joint Evaluation, 2011).  
 Tanzania is one of the largest recipients of programme aid globally, having received 
approximately US$5 billion during the period 2005 to 2012 (Budget Support Development 
Partners’ Group, 2015). Tanzania has had 14 donors contributing to its Budget Support 
programme (programme aid) since 1995. Two main assessments of the programme were 
conducted for the periods (1995 – 2004) and (2005 – 2012). The first assessment confirmed 
that programme aid improved the government’s ownership of the development process, 
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through decision making on the use of the aid resources, and that the link between citizens 
and government was reinforced through parliamentary involvement in the application of aid 
resources. On the other hand programme aid helped in improving donor harmonisation; 
where donors synchronised their development efforts and activities with each other (Budget 
Support Development Partners’ Group, 2015). 
 The second assessment found that in addition to the gains obtained from the first 
phase, programme aid also made crucial contributions to improve educational, health and 
financial management quality in Tanzania (Budget Support Development Partners’ Group, 
2015).  However, not much change was registered on capacity building as there was a weak 
demand from government for technical assistance, which could have arisen from lack of trust 
of externally financed technical assistance. Overally, the second assessment concluded that, 
“…neither project funding nor common basket funding could have achieved these same 
results with the same degree of efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability”, as was achieved 
through programme aid (Joint Independent Evaluation, 2013 pp 114). This conclusion shows 
that programme aid was considered as the best aid delivery modality for the Tanzanian 
experience. 
For the case of Zambia programme aid increased budgetary finances, facilitated the 
establishment of a comprehensive dialogue structure between donors and government which 
helped with strengthening policy dialogue, as well as alignment and harmonisation of donor 
efforts. The application of programme aid also helped the government to maintain fiscal 
discipline, improve on public expenditure and financial accountability, maintain an average 
growth rate of 6.1% during the evaluation period (2005-2010), as well as, improve quality of 
life through increased access to healthcare, and increased enrolments in schools (Kemp, Faust, 
& Leiderer, 2011). Similarly to the Tanzanian case, capacity building was not very successful 
as there was a weak demand for technical assistance from the government. Where it was 
provided it was largely supply driven (Kemp, Faust, & Leiderer, 2011). 
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2.3 Theoretical review on the effectiveness on project and programme aid  
Though there is limited empirical work on comparison of programme and project 
aid’s impact on growth, theoretically much ground has been covered in comparing the two. 
The theoretical rationale for the two aid delivery modalities is discussed below. 
2.31 Project aid is preferred over programme aid 
By design, project aid is usually directed towards specific projects and is intended to 
improve the recipient countries’ investment with limited or no government intervention. 
Gunatilake (2007) argues that since project aid gives donors more power to control the aid 
funded activities, and can bypass the central government, it is effective when there is none or 
limited agreement between government and donor on specific sector policies and priorities 
which may be due to political reasons.  
Cordella and Dell’Ariccia (2003) also claim that in recipient countries where the 
governments are not development oriented, project aid is effective because donors would 
bypass the government and direct aid resources to developmental activities to promote 
development. 
Camara (2004) also advocates for project aid for recipient countries with relatively 
lower budget resources than aid flows. Since project aid is delivered outside government 
systems; governments cannot divert the aid for unintended purposes when they are faced with 
budget pressures. 
2.32 Programme aid is preferred over project aid 
Programme aid is offered to support government policies and expenditure 
programmes usually conditional on specific policy reforms (White 1996). Its administration 
is done through recipient’s public finance management systems, (recipient’s ownership is 
strengthened, and its capacity building is more promoted since the recipient can learn by 
doing) and seeks to increase the overall government resources for economic development.  
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 Gunatilake (2007) asserts that when recipient governments are development oriented, 
their objectives and priorities usually collide with that of donors (assuming that donors 
allocate aid resources for purely developmental purposes). Under such circumstances, the use 
of programme aid is more effective than project aid because donors and recipient countries’ 
objectives and priorities can be easily harmonised. 
Foster and Fozzard (2000), also claim that programme aid is more effective than 
project aid, where stronger partnerships exist between donors and recipient governments. 
This is due to the fact that donors have the opportunity to influence the national budget 
process representing the poor, by ensuring pro poor policies are adopted, and that the 
government systems relate expenditure to resource availability and outputs. 
Similarly, Jelovac and Vandeninden (2008) maintain that the partnerships between 
donors and recipient governments enable effective platform for dialogue, planning processes, 
coordination of projects, and inhibits the principal-agent relationship between governments 
and donors as depicted in project aid. The coordination of projects and joint planning 
processes enhance the building of local capacity, as well as reduce transaction costs of aid 
delivery. 
Chatterjee,  Giuliano, and Kaya, (2007) found striking evidence of fungibility in 
investment aid which was shown to have had substituted government investment expenses. 
Since project aid is mainly channelled towards investment purposes, this creates room for 
fungibility, as governments tend to reallocate budget resources away from sectors receiving 
project aid (Cordella & Dell’Ariccia, 2003; Wilkes, 2001). Thus the use of programme aid 
can avert such problems, because donors can put conditionalities on how the aid can be used 
thereby reducing the risk of fungibility.  
There are also arguments that the conditionalities which often come with programme 
aid can help in making aid effective. Radelet (2006, pp 13) claims that; “If government 
policies have led to high rates of inflation, massive inefficiencies and waste of public 
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spending, and extensive corruption, then providing aid – whatever the specific purpose -- 
without requiring fundamental change would provide no benefits and perhaps could 
perpetuate damage.” Thus this justification for policy conditionalities is based on the belief 
that some fundamental policies and structures need to be in place for growth and 
development. So if these are not in place, then provision of aid will be futile as it will not be 
effective.  
The tables below gives a summary of findings by the empirical studies conducted on 
relationship between programme or project aid and economic growth, as well as summary of 
theoretical studies on effectiveness of programme or project aid respectively. 
Table 1: Summary of empirical studies reviewed on impact of programme or project aid on 
growth:  
Author Sample Programme aid Project aid Policy condition 
Ouattara and Strobl (2004) 71 countries 
(1974 –1997) 
 
Negative impact Positive impact No influence 
Cordella and Dell’Ariccia 
(2003) 
45 countries 
(1974 – 1993) 
No impact No impact Policy influences 
effectiveness of the 
two modalities 
 
Table 2: Summary of theoretical studies reviewed on impact of programme or project aid on 
growth:  
Author Date Programme aid preferable 
 
Project aid preferable 
Jelovac and Vandeninden  2008 
 
Where stronger partnerships exist 
between donors and recipient 
countries 
 
 
Gunatilake  2007 Where recipient countries are 
development oriented 
 
 
Camara  2004  Where own resources of recipient 
countries are relatively less than 
aid inflows 
Cordella and Dell’Ariccia  2003  Where recipient countries are not 
development oriented 
 
Foster and Fozzard  2000 Where stronger partnerships exist 
between donors and recipient 
countries 
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2.4 Conclusion 
The discussion above reflects the different circumstances where programme and 
project aid are expected to be effective in promoting growth. Though much theoretical work 
has been done on the merits and demerits of the two modalities, there is much room for 
empirical studies, which is still limited. Furthermore, the few empirical studies give 
conflicting views regarding the most effective aid modality between the two. Thus this study 
seeks to add to the limited empirical literature, giving particular focus on the Sub Sahara 
Africa region.  
The approach of analysing how the policy environment affects the effectiveness of 
both programme and project aid is key because economic growth is widely believed to be 
anchored on prevailing policy conditions within a particular country (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2008). Moreover, the design of programme aid (government -donor partnership) makes it 
more vulnerable to the internal macro-economic conditions, thus making policy consideration 
a key issue. In this regard, this study will also follow the Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
hypothesis, in determining if the impact of programme and project aid is conditional on good 
policies. To cater for potential endogeneity bias in the estimation of the growth models, two 
equations will be estimated for each model. The first equation will be estimated using 2 five-
year periods averaged data for all the variables and in the second equation, programme and 
project aid data will be lagged by one year to cater for potential endogeneity of the aid 
variables, and also the fact that aid is believed to have a delayed impact on economic growth 
(Moreira, 2005).  
This study will use actual disbursement data on programme and project aid which has 
now been updated on the OECD Creditor Reporting System for the period 2005 to 2014. The 
actual disbursement data is accurate, thus the estimated effect of both programme and project 
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aid on growth will not be subject to overestimation or underestimation bias which Cordella 
and Dell’Ariccia (2003) or Ouattara and Strobl (2004)’s studies were prone to since actual 
disbursement figures were not available at the OECD Creditor Reporting System when the 
studies were conducted.   
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The purpose of this study is to determine which modality between programme and 
project aid has more impact on economic growth, as well as to determine if the impact of the 
two modalities on economic growth is conditional on good policy environment. The 
description of the models, variables, data, and the sample will be given below, followed by a 
discussion on how potential endogeneity of the aid variables has been catered for. 
3.1 Model 1 
To determine which modality is more effective for economic growth, model 1 will be 
estimated as follows: 
(1)  Git = yitβ0 + Projitβ1+Progitβ2 + Progit2β3 + Projit2β4 + Politβ5 + Invstitβ6 +Tradeitβ7 
Lifexpitβ8  + Eduitβ9 + εit 
 
In the model, i shows countries, t shows time,  
Git is per capita real GDP growth rate,  
yit is the logarithm of initial real per capita GDP to capture the conditional convergence 
effects,  
Projit is project aid received as a percentage of GDP,  
Progit , is programme aid received as a percentage of GDP,  
Polit is the World Bank country policy and institutional assessment CPIA index, 
 Invstit is gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP, 
 Tradeit is total exports and imports as a percentage of GDP,  
Lifexpit is life expectancy, 
 Eduit is logarithm of primary enrolment, and  
εit, is a mean zero scalar. 
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3.2 Model 2 
To determine whether the impact of programme or project aid on economic growth is 
conditional on good policies and institutions, as hypothesized by Burnside and Dollar (2000), 
the programme and project aid variables in equation (1) are interacted with the country policy 
and institutional index as shown in equation (2) below:  
(2) Git = yitβ0 + ProgPolitβ1 + ProjPolitβ2 + Progitβ3 + Projitβ4 + Progit2β5 + Projit2β6 
Politβ7 + Invstitβ8 + Tradeitβ9 + Lifexpitβ10  + Eduitβ11 + εit 
 
3.3 Analysis Methodology 
The analysis is prone to reverse causality bias, where the effect of the two aid 
modalities on growth may be running in the opposite direction. Thus it is suspected that the 
error terms in models (1) and (2) may be correlated with the explanatory variables, so to 
avoid endogeneity bias; two equations are estimated for each model. The first equation is 
estimated using two 5-year periods averaged data for the dependent and all the independent 
variables with the exception of the logarithm of initial GDP per capita variable where the 
initial figure per period was used. For the second equation, programme and project aid data is 
lagged by one year to cater for the potential endogeneity of the aid variables, as well as allow 
for the delayed impact of aid on growth (Asirvatham, 2010; Clemens, Radelet, & Bhavnani, 
2004). Furthermore, the Hausman test is conducted to determine the more consistent results 
between random and fixed effects estimation. To take care of possible heteroscedasticity and 
raise the confidence level on the results, robust standard errors will be reported. 
3.4 Sample selection and Data 
Panel data for 41 Sub Sahara African countries will be used covering the period 2005 
to 2014. The time period has been limited due to unavailability of data on programme and 
project aid disbursements before 2005.  
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Table 3 below shows data description and sources.  
Table 3: Data Description and Sources 
Variable Source Format 
Average real GDP per capita growth rate World Bank Average 
Logarithm of initial Real GDP per capita World Bank Logarithm Real GDP per capita 
Programme aid  OECD CRS Percentage of GDP 
Project aid OECD CRS Percentage of GDP 
Policy (CPIA) World Bank Index [1-6], 6 being best quality 
Trade  World Bank Percentage of GDP 
Investment World Bank Percentage of GDP 
Life expectancy World Bank Years 
Education World Bank Logarithm of primary enrolment 
 
Table 4: Summary statistics 
VARIABLES N mean sd Min Max 
GDP per capita growth % 410 2.459 3.921 -37.28 18.26 
Ln initial GDP per capita 410 2.895 0.487 2.149 4.202 
Programme aid (% of GDP) 306 1.775 3.388 0.000115 50.41 
Project aid (% of GDP) 387 2.909 3.151 0.00798 17.41 
Policy (CPIA index) 391 3.356 0.561 2.300 5.001 
Investment (% of GDP) 381 24.11 10.31 3.554 69.32 
Trade (% of GDP) 392 81.45 44.69 19.12 321.6 
Life expectancy (years) 410 57.81 6.334 43.60 74.23 
Education (ln primary enrolment) 344 6.090 0.718 3.936 7.359 
Program x policy (interaction term) 292 5.972 9.806 0.000278 142.4 
Project x  policy (interaction term) 369 10.23 10.99 0.0271 71.66 
Number of countries 41     
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Table 5: Correlation Matrix 
 GDPgr Progaid Projaid Policy Invest Trade Life exp Primary lgGDPpc 
GDPgr 1.0000         
Program aid 0.0169 1.0000        
Project aid 0.0262 0.2459 1.0000       
Policy 0.2027 -0.0699 0.0246 1.0000      
Investment 0.1866 -0.0570 0.1863 0.4009 1.0000     
Trade 0.0979 0.2979 0.0471 -0.0061 0.1557 1.0000    
Life expect 0.0074 -0.0636 0.1057 0.3726 0.5497 0.2006 1.0000   
Education 0.0552 -0.0312 -0.0575 0.0294 -0.2337 -0.4757 -0.3351 1.0000  
Ln GDPpc 0.1009 -0.2050 -0.2752 0.4724 0.1943 0.3724 0.3495 -0.4594 1.0000 
 
3.5 Variables 
A short description for each of the variables used in the growth models is presented below:  
Dependent variable: 
i. Average real GDP per capita growth rate, which measures the growth 
averages of GDP per capita as the proxy for economic growth. The data on the 
variable is collected from the World Bank Development Indicators. 
 
Independent variables:  
ii. Logarithm of initial Real GDP per capita. This indicator is included to 
capture the conditional convergence effects of growth across countries. The 
variable is collected from the World Bank Development Indicators. 
iii. Project aid; the indicator is ‘project-type interventions’ from the OECD 
Creditor Reporting System. The variable is lagged to cater for potential 
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endogeneity arising from reverse causality between project aid and the GDP 
per capita growth rate; 
iv. Programme aid; the indicator is ‘total budget support’ from the OECD 
Creditor Reporting System which is the sum of general budget support and 
sector budget support. The variable is lagged to cater for potential endogeneity 
arising from reverse causality between programme aid and the GDP per capita 
growth rate. 
v. Policy is the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index which 
was developed by the World Bank, and is used as a proxy to measure the 
quality of public policies and institutions on a scale of 1 to 6, with six 
representing the highest quality.  
vi. Investment; the gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP 
indicator from the World Bank Development Indicators is used as a proxy for 
investment;  
vii. Trade; the total of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP indicator from 
the World Bank Development Indicators is used as a proxy for trade openness; 
viii. Life expectancy; is measured in number of years, and is used as a proxy to 
measure the quality of health, and the data is collected from the World Bank 
Development Indicators; 
ix. Education; is the logarithm of primary school enrolment as a proxy for human 
capital which is believed to positively affect economic growth in the long run 
(Lee, 2013) also collected from the World Bank Development Indicators. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This section provides a summary of the empirical results obtained from the quantitative 
analysis of the data conducted.   
4.1 Model 1 
Table 6: Growth model 1 regression:  
Dependent Variable: GDP per capita growth rate 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Equation 1. (AVERAGES) 
 
 Equation 2. (1 YEAR LAG) Expected 
coefficient 
sign 
   
VARIABLES 
OLS  RE  FE  OLS RE FE  
        
Initial GDP 0.965 0.203 -6.023 1.210 0.552 9.336* (-) 
 (0.802) (0.946) (8.612) (1.198) (1.166) (4.674)  
Program aid 0.759*** 0.656** 0.0138 0.330** 0.258** -0.0122 (+/-) 
 (0.270) (0.272) (0.387) (0.139) (0.130) (0.192)  
Project aid 0.0833 -0.0448 -0.273 0.0483 -0.0395 -0.441 (+/-) 
 (0.284) (0.346) (0.718) (0.243) (0.263) (0.290)  
Progaid2 -0.0483*** -0.0453*** -0.00913 -0.00702** -0.00583** -0.000305 (-) 
 (0.0166) (0.0160) (0.0300) (0.00277) (0.00267) (0.00379)  
Projaid2 -0.0151 -0.0101 -0.00360 -0.00989 -0.00625 0.0151 (-) 
 (0.0177) (0.0211) (0.0403) (0.0136) (0.0154) (0.0176)  
Policy -0.136 0.00649 1.086 1.055 1.390 5.566** (+) 
 (0.396) (0.414) (1.666) (0.776) (0.988) (2.212)  
Investment 0.0771*** 0.0817*** 0.102* 0.0424 0.0338 -0.0929 (+) 
 (0.0273) (0.0298) (0.0546) (0.0364) (0.0431) (0.0701)  
Trade 0.0254*** 0.0242*** -0.00539 0.0185* 0.0227** 0.0868** (+) 
 (0.00914) (0.00885) (0.0457) (0.00963) (0.0114) (0.0346)  
Lifexpect 0.0563 0.0518 0.0534 -0.0632 -0.0662 -0.546* (+/-) 
 (0.0561) (0.0624) (0.178) (0.0605) (0.0681) (0.299)  
Education 1.690*** 1.397*** 5.142 1.038* 1.030 15.57* (+) 
 (0.515) (0.466) (4.796) (0.611) (0.636) (8.875)  
Constant -18.17*** -13.92*** -19.56 -9.949** -8.734 -109.8**  
 (5.727) (4.880) (34.40) (4.904) (5.957) (43.56)  
        
Observations 75 75 75 181 181 181  
R-squared 0.362  0.286 0.113  0.180  
Wald Chi2(10)  30.93   52.90   
Prob > chi2    (0.0006)   (0.0000)   
Number of 
countries 
 41 41  37 37  
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The above table shows the regression results for the first model, which seeks to 
determine which aid delivery modality between programme and project aid is more effective 
for economic growth in Sub Sahara Africa region. As afore-mentioned in a bid to avoid 
endogeneity bias as well as to account for the fact that aid can have a delayed impact on 
economic growth, two equations are estimated using averaged data for the first equation and 
lagged aid variables for the second equation. The equations are estimated using three 
estimation methods namely; the ordinary least squares (OLS) method, fixed effects and 
random effects models. The Hausman tests conducted on both the averaged data and lagged 
data show that the random effects estimation is more consistent over the fixed effects, hence 
preferable.  
Hausman test for Averaged data. 
 
Hausman test for the lagged data. 
  
                Prob>chi2 =      0.1945
                          =       12.35
                  chi2(9) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
   lgprimary      5.142071     1.396954        3.745117        8.057044
   lifexpect       .053387     .0517823        .0016047        .3006249
       trade      -.005391     .0241867       -.0295777        .0500004
      invest      .1023005     .0816812        .0206194        .1020137
      policy      1.085728      .006489        1.079239        2.477863
    projaid2     -.0035972    -.0100993        .0065021        .0304239
    progaid2     -.0091287    -.0453492        .0362205        .0311264
     projaid     -.2732454    -.0447998       -.2284457        .5396233
     progaid      .0137525     .6560665        -.642314        .4532902
       lgdpc     -6.023086     .2026715       -6.225758        15.15997
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0259
                          =       20.38
                 chi2(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
   lgprimary      15.57498     1.029616        14.54537        8.286168
   lifexpect     -.5457018    -.0662338        -.479468        .2350747
       trade      .0868294     .0226919        .0641375        .0256573
      invest     -.0929098     .0337931       -.1267029        .0327611
      policy      5.566412     1.390396        4.176016        1.866852
     projsqd      .0150561    -.0062489         .021305        .0073014
     progsqd     -.0003046    -.0058346          .00553        .0023028
    Proj1lag      -.441075    -.0394832       -.4015918         .139673
    prog1lag     -.0122062     .2575571       -.2697633        .1070682
       lgdpc      9.335805      .551659        8.784146        4.071868
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
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In both equations, the random effects estimation, which is the most consistent and 
preferable estimation according to the Hausman test conducted, shows that programme aid 
has a positive and statistically significant relationship with economic growth, whilst project 
aid has no statistically significant effect on economic growth. This finding is consistent with 
the recent aid effectiveness discourse, namely, the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness 
(2005) which advocates for strong partnerships between donors and recipient countries. 
Through its design, programme aid fulfils the principles of the Paris Declaration which calls 
for participatory development through country ownership of aid funded programmes by 
governments, mutual accountability between donors and recipient countries, and use of 
country systems, ensuring that all aid is channelled through government systems.   
The negative and significant coefficient of the squared term of programme aid reflects 
a non-linear relationship and diminishing marginal returns of programme aid on economic 
growth. This finding is a generally accepted fact in the aid effectiveness literature (Burnside 
& Dollar, 2000; Cordella & Dell’Ariccia, 2003; Radelet, 2006), and means that the impact of 
additional aid decreases as aid inflows increase.   
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4.2 Model 2 
The second model seeks to address the second research question, whether impact of 
programme or project aid is conditional on quality of policy in recipient countries. In this 
regard, programme and project aid variables are interacted with the policy variable, to 
determine if policy environment affects the effectiveness of the two aid variables.  
Hausman tests conducted for both the averages data and lagged data for the second 
model show that again the random effects estimation is more consistent and preferable than 
fixed effects estimation. The Hausman tests are shown below: 
Hausman test averaged data 
 
Hausman test lagged data 
 
 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.2542
                          =       13.63
                 chi2(11) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
   lgprimary       7.13346     1.350286        5.783174        8.208594
   lifexpect      .1237585     .0466792        .0770793        .3119674
       trade     -.0184673     .0211561       -.0396234        .0509208
      invest       .126853     .0925148        .0343382        .1022522
      policy      2.452099     .0465524        2.405547         2.90224
    projaid2     -.0068748    -.0065389       -.0003359        .0320715
    progaid2     -.0222224    -.0337851        .0115627        .0279148
     projaid     -1.312813     .6147979       -1.927611         1.32919
     progaid      3.083441    -.3600934        3.443534        2.056761
     projpol      .3117845    -.2075438        .5193283        .3761352
     progpol     -.9934261     .2977484       -1.291174        .6663271
       lgdpc     -11.99826     .4093918       -12.40765        17.33864
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
                Prob>chi2 =      0.6158
                          =        9.07
                 chi2(11) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
   lgprimary      15.28425     .8340903        14.45016        8.611319
   lifexpect     -.5646241    -.0709433       -.4936808        .2371587
       trade       .091838     .0199424        .0718956        .0259529
      invest     -.0902778      .035737       -.1260148        .0311389
      policy      5.013539     1.344127        3.669412        1.932768
     projsqd      .0186659    -.0043063        .0229721        .0077629
     progsqd      .0054609    -.0018117        .0072726        .0040614
    Proj1lag      .3812109     .9305352       -.5493243        .6789526
    prog1lag     -2.055647    -1.246939       -.8087079        .9224568
     projpol       -.25783     -.298389         .040559        .1808936
     progpol      .6192697      .458851        .1604187        .2623071
       lgdpc      8.850992     .7814341        8.069558        4.117327
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
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The regression results for model 2 are shown in the table below: 
Table 7: Growth model 2 regression:  
Dependent Variable: GDP per capita growth rate  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The table shows mixed results on the interaction of the two aid delivery variables with 
policy across the different estimation models. The random effects estimation, which is the 
more consistent model according to the Hausman tests conducted shows that for Equation 1 
(averages) policy has no impact for the effectiveness of the two aid delivery modalities. 
However, moving to the second equation (1 year lag) the random effects results show that 
 Equation 1. (AVERAGES) Equation 2. (1 YEAR LAG) Expected 
coefficient 
sign 
 
 
VARIABLES OLS  RE  FE  OLS RE FE   
         
Initial GDPpc 1.111 0.409 -12.00 1.400 0.781 8.851* (-)  
 (0.867) (1.132) (11.70) (1.199) (1.152) (4.887)   
Progpolicy 0.539 0.298 -0.993* 0.487* 0.459 0.619* (+)  
 (0.416) (0.507) (0.549) (0.270) (0.291) (0.352)   
Projpolicy -0.228 -0.208 0.312 -0.233 -0.298** -0.258 (+)  
 (0.188) (0.264) (0.587) (0.202) (0.131) (0.201)   
Program aid -1.139 -0.360 3.083* -1.286 -1.247 -2.056* (+/-)  
 (1.531) (1.879) (1.725) (0.859) (0.943) (1.114)   
Project aid 0.823 0.615 -1.313 0.813 0.931** 0.381 (+/-)  
 (0.777) (1.120) (2.521) (0.671) (0.419) (0.621)   
Progaid2 -0.0267 -0.0338 -0.0222 -0.00244 -0.00181 0.00546 (-)  
 (0.0254) (0.0301) (0.0325) (0.00299) (0.00323) (0.00369)   
Projaid2 -0.0122 -0.00654 -0.00687 -0.00921 -0.00431 0.0187 (-)  
 (0.0166) (0.0186) (0.0299) (0.0148) (0.0184) (0.0199)   
Policy -0.190 0.0466 2.452 0.866 1.344 5.014** (+)  
 (0.373) (0.380) (1.633) (0.845) (0.998) (2.279)   
Investment 0.0830*** 0.0925*** 0.127** 0.0414 0.0357 -0.0903 (+)  
 (0.0303) (0.0334) (0.0623) (0.0390) (0.0465) (0.0708)   
Trade 0.0218** 0.0212* -0.0185 0.0157 0.0199* 0.0918** (+)  
 (0.0104) (0.0113) (0.0427) (0.00969) (0.0115) (0.0355)   
Life expectancy 0.0475 0.0467 0.124 -0.0670 -0.0709 -0.565* (+/-)  
 (0.0602) (0.0657) (0.238) (0.0607) (0.0696) (0.304)   
Education 1.503** 1.350** 7.133* 0.811 0.834 15.28 (+)  
 (0.608) (0.549) (4.224) (0.632) (0.682) (9.724)   
Constant -16.51** -14.04** -22.54 -7.986 -7.556 -104.2**   
 (6.913) (5.740) (37.77) (5.498) (7.370) (47.70)   
         
Observations 75 75 75 181 181 181   
R-squared 0.378  0.348 0.121  0.192   
Wald Chi2(12)  75.18        81.11    
Prob > chi2    (0.0000)   (0.0000)    
Countries  41 41  37 37   
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project aid on its own has a positive significant relationship with growth, however its 
interacted term with policy gives a negative statistically significant relationship with 
economic growth. Thus to see the overall net effect of project aid on growth when project aid 
is interacted with policy, model 2 equation is differentiated with respect to project aid to see 
the marginal effect of project aid on growth (Lee, 2013). Thus the marginal effect of project 
aid is calculated as shown in equation 3 below:  
(3)    git = -0.298 ProjPolit + 0.931 Projit + 2*(-0.00431) Projit      
The marginal effect of project aid on economic growth is positive, which shows that 
project aid will promote growth in good policy environments. This finding is consistent with 
World Bank (1998), Burnside and Dollar (2000), and Lee (2013), who also found that aid 
was effective in good policy environments. 
Since both the coefficient of programme aid and that of its interaction term with 
policy are not statistically significant, it shows that for this dataset, policy environment is not 
a necessary condition for the effectiveness of programme aid on promoting economic growth. 
This finding is in line with the findings of  Clemens, Radelet, & Bhavnani, (2004), and  
Ouattara and Strobl (2004). 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Conclusion 
The overall purpose of this study was to analyse and compare which aid delivery 
modality, between programme and project aid is more effective in promoting economic 
growth in the Sub Sahara African region, and to determine if the two modalities effectiveness 
on economic growth is conditional on good policy environments. 
The results indicate that programme aid has a positive impact and promotes economic 
growth, though it is also shown to have diminishing marginal returns on growth. Project aid 
on its own has no impact on economic growth, however, it is shown to positively affect 
growth in good policy environments as shown by the positive marginal effect of project aid 
on growth when it is interacted by policy. 
Since the Sub Sahara Africa region has mainly been receiving aid through the project 
aid modality, this could be one reason why aid has not been effective in promoting economic 
growth in this region, because according to this study, programme aid is more effective in 
promoting economic growth than project aid.  
5.2 Policy Recommendations  
Considering the foregoing results and conclusion, programme aid promotes growth in 
the Sub Sahara Africa region.  As earlier discussed, the use of programme aid entails 
participatory development and country ownership of aid funded programmes by recipient 
governments, use of country systems, and can create a base for mutual accountability 
between donors and recipient countries (Gunatilake, 2007), which are key principles for aid 
effectiveness (Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness, 2005).  
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The study also found that project aid has a positive net marginal effect on growth for 
countries with good policy environments, hence showing the importance of good policy 
environments in recipient countries. 
In this regard, it is recommended that aid to the Sub Sahara African region be 
delivered through the form of programme aid, and that efforts should be put in place by both 
recipient countries and donor countries to build strong partnerships as well as, improve the 
policy environments in recipient countries to ensure aid effectiveness.  
Through the nature of its application, programme aid  supports macroeconomic 
stability, makes use of local national accounting and budget systems, reduces transaction 
costs, and allows for coherence between planning and budgeting, giving it the advantage of  
improving policy framework and capacity building in recipient countries.  An evaluation of 
the European Union Budget Support programme which was conducted in African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) countries , showed that broad progress was made in improving; 
macroeconomic stability, public finance management, and streamlining transaction costs in 
the application of aid (European Commission, 2005). This progress shows that indeed the 
delivery of aid through programme aid modality improves the policy environment as well as, 
public finance management in recipient countries which contributes to aid effectiveness.  
However, the application of programme aid at a large scale may be threatened by the 
fact that it requires extensive donor collaboration and harmonisation which can be a toll order 
to arrive at since most donors render aid for different reasons, so to harmonise all aid can be a 
challenge especially for developing countries which have relatively lower negotiation power.  
Moreover, as was seen in the experience of Mali that programme aid was not effective 
in creating new policies through conditionality, but thrived where good policies already 
existed (OECD DAC Joint Evaluation, 2011), shows that programme aid is effective under 
certain circumstances. For non-performing countries with poor public finance management 
systems, and where even no progress has been achieved through project aid, then programme 
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aid will not be effective since it requires some degree of sound policies, and public finance 
management systems for its effectiveness. 
This then shows the imperative need for SSA countries to work towards establishment 
of sound policies and efficient public finance management systems as a basis for ensuring aid 
effectiveness on promoting economic growth.   
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